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The Iranian nuclear programme has been of great relevance and importance in the International Community 
over the past two decades due to the risk it poses to international stability, security and peace, and the nuclear 
crisis that ensued. The efforts of European diplomacy since the early 2000s have had major consequences for 
global security, Middle East stability, International Law and non-proliferation. This dissertation seeks to 
provide some clarity on the European Union’s role in the Iran nuclear crisis. To this end, emphasis will be 
placed on the 2015 Join Comprehensive Plan of Action, the steps that led to its conclusion and how the 
United States withdrawal from it undermined European efforts thus far. Finally, the possible re-joining of the 
United States will be addressed. 
 








El programa nuclear iraní ha tenido gran relevancia e importancia en la Comunidad Internacional durante las 
últimas dos décadas debido al riesgo que supone para la estabilidad, la seguridad y la paz internacionales, y a la 
crisis nuclear en la que derivó. Los esfuerzos de la diplomacia europea desde principios de los 2000 han tenido 
grandes consecuencias para la seguridad mundial, la estabilidad de Oriente Medio, el Derecho Internacional y 
la no proliferación. En el presente trabajo se busca ofrecer un poco de claridad respecto al papel de la Unión 
Europea en la crisis nuclear de Irán. Para ello, se hará hincapié en el Plan de Acción Integral Conjunto del año 
2015, los pasos que llevaron a su consecución y cómo la retirada de Estados Unidos de este derribó los 
esfuerzos europeos hasta el momento. Por último, se abordará la posible reincorporación de Estados Unidos. 
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This dissertation focuses on a topical issue: the Iran nuclear crisis, and more specifically the role 
of the European Union in it. Since the Second World War, during the Cold War and up to the 
present day, nuclear weapons have conditioned security and peace, in other words, they have 
endangered global stability. Thus, the Iranian nuclear programme has been conceived as one of the 
greatest global destabilisers because of its questionable peaceful nature and because of its geopolitical 
location, the Middle East, an unstable and conflictive region. 
In an attempt to ensure that Iran’s nuclear programme does not lead to a nuclear bomb, the 
European Union has, since the end of the twentieth century, devoted significant efforts of its foreign 
policy to this end. Relations between the Islamic Republic of Iran and the European Union and its 
Member States have undergone numerous changes in recent decades due to the former’s activities 
and the latter’s policies. Yet the influence of the other side of the Atlantic, expressly the United 
States, cannot be neglected or disregarded. 
The aim of this dissertation is therefore to shed light on a complex and relevant issue in the 
international context to better understand the developments of the recent years and those taking 
place now. To this end, events will be presented chronologically to ultimately arrive at the present 
time. Firstly, the early years of the nuclear crisis will be addressed together with the different 
solutions provided by the International Community through the United Nations Security Council in 
general, and the European Union in particular. This will be followed by an appraisal of the Joint 
Comprehensive Plan of Action and the changes it brought about for the International Community 
and the European Union. It will then take stock of the first years of its existence and, in specific 
terms, for the European Union-Iran relations and how these were bounced by the United States 
withdrawal. The consequences of this action will be assessed together with the response given by the 
Union and the Islamic Republic. Subsequently, the current state of play on the possible re-join of the 
United States into the agreement will be presented. Finally, some final conclusions are drawn based 
on the facts presented. For this dissertation, the most up-to-date doctrinal sources on the subject 
have been used, it could not have been done in any other way due to the novelty of the events. 
2 
 
2. A first approach to the Iran Nuclear Crisis 
Iran’s foreign relations have always been complicated both by its eagerness to develop nuclear 
capabilities and by its position in a highly unstable region. The Iranian Revolution (1979) and the 
Iran-Iraq War (1980-1988) changed relations with Europe and more dramatically with the United 
States (US). While it is true that after the Iranian Revolution Europe-Iran relations suffered in the 
political and economic areas, diplomatic relations never quite faded away as they did with the US;1 
with the end of the Iran-Iraq war, economic and political relations between the Islamic Republic and 
Europe resumed. The European Union’s concern with Iran’s behaviour regarding human rights, the 
assassination of regime dissidents and terrorism, as well as its arms purchases, and the risk they pose 
to stability in the Middle East, motivated the European Council to call the Iranian Government for a 
Critical Dialogue in 1992. Through this Dialogue, the European Council2 also expected Iran to take 
“a constructive approach” in the Middle East Peace Process. As Torbat3 presents, it can be argued 
that this call for a dialogue from the European Union (EU) was intended to justify diplomatic and 
trade relations between Brussels and Tehran, despite the actions committed by Iran, contrary to the 
values and principles on which the EU is based and which it advocates in its external relations. The 
approach to EU-Iran relations shifted towards a Comprehensive Dialogue from 1998 on, this 
Dialogue was framed as an open and global policy.4 The Commission5 suggested encompassing the 
dialogue in three different areas: global and regional issues likewise cooperation. For this, technical 
working groups were established between the Commission and Iran. EU’s interests in the region 
were both economic and political, Iran’s petroleum and gas reserves were and still are crucial for the 
Union just as stability in the region, Iran’s military capacity can be a source of instability in the 
Middle East and a trigger for other countries in the region to develop their capabilities; the EU 
believes that Tehran is a key player in achieving stability in the Middle East hence the Union has 
 
 
1 D. R. JALILVAND, “EU-Iran Relations: Iranian Perceptions and European Policy”, in AYBARS GÖRGÜLÜ; GÜLSAH 
DARK KAHYAOGLU (eds.), The Remaking of the Euro-Mediterranean Vision: Challenging Eurocentrism with Local Perceptions in the 
Middle East and North Africa, Peter Lang Publishing Group: Bern, Berlin, Brussels, New York, Oxford, Warszawa, Vienna, 
2019 (Global Politics and Security), pp. 117–145, at 123–124. 
2 EUROPEAN COUNCIL, European Council in Edinburgh. Conclusions of the Presidency. 
3 A. E. TORBAT, “The Economic Sanctions Against Iran”, in A. E. TORBAT (ed.), Politics of Oil and Nuclear Technology in 
Iran, Springer International Publishing: Cham, 2020, pp. 201–224, at 211. 
4 Ibid. 
5 COMMISSION, Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council - EU relations with 
the Islamic Republic of Iran, COM/2001/0071, 2001. 
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always expressed its concern about the country’s fragile democracy and lack of respect for human 
rights.6 
In 1997, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) introduced the Additional Protocol 
(hereinafter referred to as AP) to its Safeguards Agreement intending to have greater knowledge and 
control over the practices and status of the activities carried out by the States. Accession to this 
protocol is voluntary but once signed, it creates obligations and grants rights for both the State and 
the IAEA. On the one hand, States commit themselves to provide the IAEA with information on 
their nuclear and nuclear-related activities, waste, equipment and material as well as grant the IAEA 
access for short-notice inspections. On the other hand, it allows the IAEA to collect samples, use 
international communications systems and request information with short notice.7 Iran decided not 
to sign this AP after several States urged it to do so, some EU Member States among them. 
Moreover, in Summer 2002 there were rumours –coming from the National Council of Resistance of 
Iran– that the Islamic Republic was working on a nuclear programme and had secret nuclear 
facilities. Rumours were confirmed in February 2003 when the IAEA Director-General visited Iran. 
He certified that the nuclear facility consisted of a 100-centrifuge cascade at Natanz and a “heavy 
water production facility at Arak”. Further, he discovered “evidence of past enrichment activity”8 
though it was not until summer when Tehran admitted this last activity.9 With this inspection, it 
came to light that Iran had not been declaring all the activities it owed to the IAEA as part of the 
Non-Proliferation Treaty,10 though this failure to report did not constitute a violation of the NPT 
nor of the IAEA Statute as the IAEA stated.11 In the light of these events, in June 2003, the EU 
suspended the trade and association agreement negotiations that had started in December 2002. 
Some months later, in October, given the gravity of the situation, Germany, the United Kingdom 
 
 
6 C. ADEBAHR; R. ALCARO, “The EU and Iran: how a critical relationship became a troubled one”, in D. BOURIS; D. 
HUBER; M. PACE (eds.), The Routledge Handbook on EU-Middle East Relations, Routledge: Oxford, forthcoming. 
7 IAEA, Factsheet on the Additional Protocol: verifying that all nuclear material remains in peaceful activities, International Atomic 
Energy Agency, 2021. 
8 R. J. REARDON, “Iran’s Nuclear Program: Past, Present, and Future”, in Containing Iran, RAND Corporation, 2012 
(Strategies for Addressing the Iranian Nuclear Challenge), pp. 9–64, at 15. 
9 T. SAUER, “Coercive Diplomacy by the EU: The Iranian Nuclear Weapons Crisis”, (2007) 28(3), Third World Quarterly, 
pp. 613–633, at 617. 
10 Iran signed the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) in 1968, the same year that it opened for signature, and ratified in 
1970, from this year is then bound to the treaty. In practice, this means that it cannot buy nuclear weapons, it has to 
declare its nuclear activities to the IAEA and can develop a nuclear programme only for civilian purposes, i.e., to generate 
electricity. Ibid. 
11 IAEA, Implementation of NPT safeguards agreement in the Islamic Republic of Iran, 2003; T. SAUER, supra note 9, p. 617. 
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and France (the E3) advocated for a negotiating strategy and continued negotiations with Iran, this 
time in Tehran. The result of this diplomatic move by the E3, supported by other EU Member 
States, was Tehran’s signature of the AP, the suspension of its enrichment programme12 and its 
willingness to cooperate.13 Nonetheless, Iran has never ratified the AP, yet it notified the IAEA that 
it would provisionally apply it from the 16th of January 2016.14 Further, Iran challenged the definition 
of suspension15 and anyhow it recognised that the suspension was temporary.16 At the end of 2003, 
the High Representative of the Union for Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), Javier 
Solana, joined the E3 on their negotiations with Iran;17 together they now constitute the E3/EU 
team. 
The 2003 E3 meeting in Tehran culminated in the signing of the Paris Agreement on 14 
November 2004, bringing to an end the nuclear activities that Iran had been conducting for the past 
year, more precisely the construction of a heavy water plant and uranium conversion.18 Iran 
accordingly agreed to stop its enrichment program with nuclear purposes and committed to “IAEA 
inspections and safeguards regime”.19 The EU, on her part, offered positive inducements appreciably 
“the lifting of economic sanctions”. Both parties reaffirmed their commitment to the NPT and 
recognised Iran’s right to exercise the rights acquired under this treaty.20 
In 2005, the Paris Agreement of 2004, which was believed to be successful, came to an end after 
the Iranian presidential election. The new president, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, announced that he 
would resume Iran’s enrichment activities, thus ending voluntary compliance with the AP and IAEA 
inspections and refused the EU’s new proposal. Both actions made the EU terminate negotiations, 
 
 
12 T. SAUER, supra note 9, p. 618. 
13 ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN; BRITAIN; et al., Tehran Joint Statement. 
14 Which, as will be seen below, is the date of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action’s Implementation Day. Therefore, 
it is not a coincidence that the Islamic Republic agreed to implement the AP, but rather the result of its obligations under 
the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action. IAEA, Status List Conclusion of Additional Protocols, International Atomic Energy 
Agency, 2020. 
15 R. J. REARDON, supra note 8, p. 15. 
16 R. BERMEJO GARCÍA; C. GUTIÉRREZ ESPADA, “Del programa nuclear de la República Islámica de Irán y de su 
evolución (política y derecho)”, (2015) (31), Anuario español de derecho internacional, pp. 7–63, at 20. 
17 Ibid. 
18 T. SAUER, supra note 9, p. 619. 
19 R. J. REARDON, supra note 8, p. 16. 
20 N. GNESOTTO, “Statement by Javier Solana on the agreement on Iran’s nuclear programme”, (2005), EU Security and 
defence: core documents 2004, pp. 275-277. 
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which would only resume once Iran suspended its enrichment programme.21 The E3, in line with its 
intention to resolve the conflict through diplomatic dialogue, proposed Iran a new negotiating table 
for December, which, as expected, was rejected.22 After enrichment activities were restarted, the E3 
succeeded in getting the US to negotiate with Iran, on the condition that the Islamic Republic had 
suspended enrichment to start negotiations. Solana, for his part, convinced the US, Russia and China 
to agree on a joint package of measures along the lines of sanctions in the next United Nations 
Security Council Resolution (hereunder UNSCR).23 From this point on, the Iranian counterpart will 
be E3/EU+3. 
Before referring the issue to the Security Council, the IAEA wished to verify that Iran had 
resumed enriching activities and that it was no longer complying with the AP or other voluntary 
agreements; this was confirmed in its 2006 visit.24 The matter was therefore referred to the United 
Nations Security Council (UNSC). Sanctions were initially blocked in the face of Russian and 
Chinese refusals and instead, positive inducements were introduced. The P525 and Germany (or 
E3+3) with the support of the High Representative of the Union for CFSP, agreed to ask Iran to 
suspend its enrichment activities to start negotiations.26 Resolution 169627 was passed in July and set 
August as the deadline for the IAEA Director-General to verify if Iran had suspended all its 
enrichment-related, reprocessing, and research and development (R&D) activities. On their behalf, 
the E3/EU+3 agreed to not take additional measures if Iran complied with the Resolution. In 
August, UNSCR 173728 was passed as Iran had “not established full and sustained suspension of all 
enrichment-related activities and reprocessing activities” as required by the previous Resolution. This 
last Resolution had called Iran to halt its nuclear programme and imposed, for the first time, 
sanctions on Iran by way of “a travel ban, a freeze of assets, a ban on weapons, and a ban on goods 
 
 
21 R. J. REARDON, supra note 8, p. 17; T. SAUER, supra note 9, p. 620. 
22 T. SAUER, supra note 9, p. 620. 
23 Ibid., p. 621. 
24 IAEA, Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Islamic Republic of Iran, International Atomic Energy Agency, 
2006. 
25 The five permanent members of the UNSC or P5 are the Russian Federation, the French Republic, the United States, 
the United Kingdom and the People’s Republic of China. 
26 R. J. REARDON, supra note 8, p. 17. 
27 UNSC, Resolution 1696 - Acting under Article 40 of Chapter VII of the Charter, 2006. 
28 UNSC, Resolution 1737 - Acting under Article 41 of Chapter VII of the Charter, 2006. 
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related to the nuclear and ballistic missile programs”29 and set a new deadline: February 2007. 
Predictably, Iran’s response to the imposition of sanctions and the new due date was nothing else 
than no compliance. This time by “installing centrifugates at the FEP,30 and a ban on 28 IAEA 
inspectors from Natanz”31 and continuing to enrich uranium.32 And so, in 2007, the UNSC approved 
Resolution 174733 to widen the scope of the already imposed sanctions. The Resolution called Iran to 
immediately cease its enrichment-related, reprocessing, R&D activities and gave the IAEA 60-days to 
issue a report on the suspension of the activities. Further, it also banned “the country’s arms exports 
and froze the assets and restricted the travel of additional individuals engaged in the country’s 
proliferation-sensitive nuclear activities”.34 In September, the E3 got Iran’s chief negotiator to agree 
to a meeting in New York with the E3 representatives, to suspend its enrichment activities in 
exchange for removing Iran’s nuclear dossier from the UNSC.35 Iran’s failure to suspend fully and 
sustainably enrichment-related and reprocessing activities and heavy water-related projects led the 
UNSC to pass a new Resolution36 (1803 in 2008); the aim of which was to increase pressure on Iran 
and to advocate for diplomacy as a means to find a solution.37 Resolution 1803 froze individual and 
entities’ assets and banned travel and dual-use goods –those that may have an illicit application as 
they serve both military and civilian purposes–. 
UNSC members realised that the Iranian conflict required further sanctions to the ones imposed 
in its various Resolutions (1737, 1747, 1803) as, despite this, Iran had failed to halt its nuclear-related 
activities during this period (2006-2010), which prompted the UNSC to adopt a new Resolution38 
(1929) to widen the scope of the previous Resolutions. Resolution 1929 strengthens the active arms 
embargo as well as the travel ban to those individuals involved in the nuclear programme, it 
especially prohibits conducting ballistic missile activities and, therefore, also ballistic technologies. In 
 
 
29 F. GIUMELLI, “Implementation of Sanctions: European Union”, in M. ASADA (ed.), Economic Sanctions in International 
Law and Practice, Routledge: Oxford and New York, 2020, pp. 116–135, at 127. 
30 Fuel Enrichment Plant 
31 R. J. REARDON, supra note 8, p. 18. 
32 A. E. TORBAT, supra note 3, p. 202. 
33 UNSC, Resolution 1747 - Acting under Article 41 of Chapter VII of the Charter, 2007. 
34 UN DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC INFORMATION, Security Council toughens sanctions against Iran, adds arms embargo, with 
Unanimous Adoption of Resolution 1747. 
35 R. J. REARDON, supra note 8, p. 17. 
36 UNSC, Resolution 1803 - Acting under Article 41 of Chapter VII of the Charter, 2008. 
37 K. SUZUKI, “Iran: The role and effectiveness of UN sanctions”, in M. ASADA (ed.), Economic Sanctions and International 
Law and Practice, Routledge: New York, 2020, pp. 178-199, at 183. 
38 UNSC, Resolution 1929 - Acting under Article 41 of Chapter VII of the Charter, 2010. 
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addition, Iranian assets were frozen in an attempt to prevent economic transactions related to 
nuclear work39 and urged the Member States to control their financial transactions so that they were 
not indirectly contributing to Iran’s prohibited activities.40 These economic sanctions imposed on 
financial resources or services “caused substantial harm to the Iranian economy”.41 
2010 marked a turning point as the EU for the first time decided that the multilateral United 
Nations (UN) sanctions it had been supporting for the past few years were not enough and that the 
situation required additional sanctions. EU sanctions were never envisaged as substitutes of UN 
sanctions, but rather as complementary; although it must be noted that EU sanctions have 
sometimes been implemented in absence of UN action.42 In this point, the Council43 introduces 
restrictive measures, these include but were not limited to a ban on the import of crude oil, on the 
provision of insurance and re-insurance services to the Tehran government by the Member States, 
and on new investments, technical assistance and transfers of technology to Iranian oil and gas 
companies by European energy corporations.44 Not only is the first time that the EU decided to go 
one step further than the UN, but it is also the first time that does so by imposing sanctions on 
activities that are not directly related to Iran’s nuclear programme.45 
In 2012, the Council introduces new sanctions against Iran, the most notable restrictive measure 
is the oil embargo. Essential energy transactions for the EU could still take place, not 
uncoincidentally since Greece, Italy and Spain were the Member States suffering the most from the 
crisis and, in turn, the largest EU importers of Iranian oil. The EU was firm in its stance against Iran 
even if that heightened the ongoing crisis or the imposition of Iranian sanctions on any of its 
Member States. After the 2011 EU boycott on Iran’s oil, Member States buying Iranian oil had to 
pay for their imports in dollars, which contributed to the depreciation of the Euro.46 Further, 
 
 
39 N. HASSIBI; T. SAUER, “Easing sanctions on Iran might someday be necessary—but it won’t be easy”, (2013) 69(5), 
Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, pp. 46–55, at 48. 
40 K. SUZUKI, supra note 37, p. 185. 
41 D. R. JALILVAND, supra note 1, p. 129; K. SUZUKI, supra note 37. 
42 L. S. BORLINI; S. SILIGARDI, “Defining Elements and Emerging Legal Issues of EU ‘Sanctions’”, (2018) 27(1), The 
Italian Yearbook of International Law Online, pp. 33-52, at 34. 
43 COUNCIL, Council Regulation of 25 October 2010 on restrictive measures against Iran and repealing Regulation No 
432/2007, 961/2010, 2010. 
44 N. HASSIBI; T. SAUER, supra note 39, p. 49; A. E. TORBAT, supra note 3, p. 214. 
45 A. B. TABRIZI, “The EU’s sanctions regime against Iran in the aftermath of the JPA”, (2013) (818), Policy Memo, p 2. 
46 A. E. TORBAT, supra note 3, pp. 214–215. 
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restrictive measures also included freezing the assets of the Central Bank of Iran (CBI);47 nineteen 
Iranian banks48 were disconnected from SWIFT,49 which in practice meant that their transactions 
were no longer processed50 and thus the financial isolation of Iran;51 the prohibition of importing 
precious and industrial metals; the prohibition of transactions with Iranian natural gas and with 
Iranian banks and financial institutions; and many more measures on the energy, transport and 
financial sectors.52 
The election of Hassan Rouhani in the 2013 Iranian presidential elections was favourable towards 
a return to dialogue between the E3/EU+353 and Iran. Thus, the Joint Plan of Action (JPA) was 
born out of dialogue and negotiations through diplomacy. This political agreement was signed in 
Geneva on 24 November 2013 and implemented on 20 January 2014; it provides a road map 
intending to reach a genuine negotiation that will lead to the solution of the crisis54 and is therefore 
presented as the first step. This joint plan has a duration of six months and may be renewed if 
mutual consent by the parties. This agreement was beneficial for both parties. On the one hand, 
sanctions on associated insurance and transportation services, on Iran’s petrochemical exports and 
associated services, on gold and precious metals and associated services placed by the EU and the US 
were suspended as well as those imposed by the US on Iran’s auto industry and associated services. 
It was also agreed that there would be no new nuclear-related UNSC, US or EU sanctions and that 
those in place by the UNSC would be comprehensively lifted. Nonetheless, it is important to note 
that the suspension of sanctions is conditional to Iran’s compliance which, if absent, would trigger 
sanctions again. Further, Iran could continue to access civilian nuclear activities. On the other hand, 
 
 
47 Up until then, the CBI had been exempted from EU sanctions, still not from the US. The EU’s restrictive measures 
imposed on this entity meant an alignment of policies on both sides of the Atlantic. N. HASSIBI; T. SAUER, supra note 39, 
p. 49. 
48 F. GIUMELLI; P. IVAN, “The effectiveness of EU sanctions: An analysis of Iran, Belarus, Syria and Myanmar (Burma)”, 
(2013), EPC Issue Paper, p. 16. 
49 The Society for Worldwide Interbank Financial Telecommunication, based in Belgium, is the world’s most widely used 
electronic banking system. A. E. TORBAT, supra note 3, p. 215. 
50 As, for being based in Belgium, SWIFT is bound to the law of this State. 
51 F. GIUMELLI; P. IVAN, supra note 48, p. 16. 
52 N. HASSIBI; T. SAUER, supra note 39, p. 49. 
53 The EU is now represented by Catherine Ashton, who is the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and 
Security Policy from 2009 to 2014. EEAS, “High Representative/Vice President”, European External Action Service - 
European Commission. 
54 R. BERMEJO GARCÍA; C. GUTIÉRREZ ESPADA, supra note 16, p. 36. 
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the IAEA-controlled block on Iran’s nuclear weapons procurement was a relief for the E3+3.55 
Following the signature of the Joint Plan of Action and its entry into force, the EU suspended the 
sanctions in force56 against Iran under the JPA for the duration of the agreement, six months. In 
June 2014, the parties agreed on extending the measures in place and negotiations until November, 
when they extended them again until March. June 2015 was the new deadline for ending 
negotiations. However, due to excessive focus on the nuclear programme and not so much on the 
arms embargo and missile development, negotiations were extended two weeks57 and culminated in 
the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action. 
3. The Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action 
3.1. The Union’s interests under the JCPOA 
As has been advanced and as it is to be expected in concluding such agreements, the EU was 
motivated by a variety of concrete interests stemming from the threats58 posed by the crisis and 
which can be divided into four categories:59 normative, security, strategic and economic. These 
interests were pursued by the Union throughout the negotiations and, eventually, incorporated into 
the JCPOA. This was not easy as the interests among the parties diverged not so much on the idea 
but on the priority they gave them. The most intricate challenge was to adapt the Union’s interests 
with those of the Islamic Republic, as Iran’s primary interests were secondary for the EU by the 
different impact they had on both economies;60 these divergences were on trade and energy. Not 
surprisingly, Iran sought to ease the oil sanctions and a renewed European and trade investment deal. 
Contrariwise, the principal incentive for the Union was security as it believes Iran to be key for 
achieving stability in the Middle East and the first step towards starting a dialogue with other actors 
 
 
55 As can be guessed, the countries that constitute the E3+3 are Germany, the United Kingdom, France, Russia, China 
and the United States. 
56 Sanctions that are not part of the Joint Plan of Action, such as those relating to terrorism or human rights, were not 
suspended. 
57 K. SUZUKI, supra note 37, p. 189. 
58 These threats are terrorism, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, illicit trafficking, threats against European 
nationals in the region, migration flows and energy security. R. ALCARO; A. DESSÌ, “A Last Line of Defence: A Strategy 
for Europe to Preserve the Iran Nuclear Deal”, (2019) 19(14), IAI Papers, p. 6. 
59 R. ALCARO, “Europe’s Defence of the Iran Nuclear Deal: Less than a Success, More than a Failure”, (2021) 56(1), The 
International Spectator, pp. 55–72; R. ALCARO; A. DESSÌ, supra note 58. 
60 The negative impact EU and US sanctions were having on Iran’s economy was the main motive that drove Tehran to 




in the region. And, further, the EU suspected that the US and Israel would be willing to use their 
military capabilities to tear down Iran’s nuclear programme.61 Linked to this is the Union’s normative 
interest in the non-proliferation regime, as in the EU’s eyes the Iranian nuclear programme triggers 
security in the region; by enhancing non-proliferation the risk of conflict is reduced. Moreover, the 
Union believed it was essential that the role of the UNSC and the IAEA were strengthened in 
monitoring Iran’s compliance. In strategic terms, this agreement was a victory for the EU’s foreign 
policy by showing how disputes can be peacefully solved through diplomacy. Additionally, the Union 
saw the Deal as an opportunity to start a political dialogue with Tehran on different questions, 
notably on human rights. Finally, economic interests were directed towards re-accessing Iran’s 
market, particularly the energy one. 
3.2. Content of the agreement and how it changes the statu quo 
The Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action was the culmination of twelve years of negotiations and 
of the diplomatic effort by the EU and, more especially, the E3 to achieve a peaceful resolution of 
the crisis through dialogue; and, not least, the demonstration that diplomacy is a great means of 
solving international conflicts.62 The Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (hereinafter referred to as 
JCPOA) –also known as the Iran Nuclear Deal– was signed on 14 July 2015 as a political agreement 
and, therefore, it did not have binding force. The JCPOA was concluded with the aim of preparing 
the UNSCR that would endorse it and make it binding, as such and somewhat peculiarly, the 
negotiations took place in Vienna rather than in New York, where UNSCR negotiations are usually 
held. The role of the EU in the JCPOA negotiations should not be underestimated as it appeared as 
a mediator between the E3 and the 3 (US, Russia and China). The technical knowledge of the 
negotiations rested on the Union and, more specifically, on the European External Action Service 
(EEAS). This last service drew up the text of the agreement63 and structured it in seven parts: 
Preface, Preamble and general provisions, and five annexes (annex I regarding Nuclear-Related 
measures, annex II about Sanctions-related commitments, annex III concerning Civil Nuclear 
Cooperation, annex IV on the Joint Commission and annex V with reference to Implementation 
Day). The second part (preamble and general provisions) was, at the same time, divided into four 
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different categories: Nuclear, Sanctions, Implementation Plan and Dispute Resolution Mechanism 
(DRM). 
UNSCR 2231 came a few days after the political agreement –on 20 July– and was adopted by 
unanimity. The Resolution is structured in three parts: the main body, Annex A (JCPOA signed in 
Vienna and its five annexes) and Annex B (Statement). It establishes the obligation to comply with 
the provisions therein by endorsing the JCPOA and by underscoring that UN Member States are 
bound to accept and carry out the UNSC decisions under Article 25 of the UN Charter.64 It does 
seem clear that the endorsement of the JCPOA through a UNSCR gives it binding force, 
notwithstanding the fact that the heading of the main body indicates that they are “voluntary 
measures”.65 This has not been exempt from controversies and is one of the justifications the US 
found for withdrawing, as will be seen below. In any case, the Resolution requires full 
implementation. 
Annex V of the JCPOA details the adoption, implementation, transition and termination days. 
Adoption day was established to be ninety days after the endorsement of the UNSCR 2231 –18 
October 2015, hence– and was meant to prepare the parties to enforce their obligations on 
Implementation Day. Iran for its part had to ratify and apply the AP and accordingly inform the 
IAEA; and the EU and the US had to adapt their legislation for the lifting of sanctions as set out in 
the Resolution, which would be effective on Implementation Day if Iran fulfilled its obligations. 
Once the IAEA verified that Iran had complied with the nuclear-related measures66, and the EU and 
the US had taken the appropriate actions to satisfy paragraphs 16 and 17, respectively, from Annex 
V, the Resolution endorsing the JCPOA entered into force. Implementation Day was 16 January 
2016. Transition Day was set to be eight years after –from Adoption Day–, a date that has not yet 
arrived as less than five years have passed since then. In July 2026 will be Termination Day –ten 
years after Adoption Day– as set out in the Resolution; and will be the date on which Resolution 
2231 will cease to apply and “the UN Security Council would no longer be seized of the Iran nuclear 
issue”67 unless provisions from previous resolutions were reinstated. 
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The JCPOA includes three elements that are worth highlighting. The first one,68 the Dispute 
Resolution Mechanism or the so-called ‘snap back’ mechanism, refers to the obligation of the parties 
to comply with the agreement, although it can only be applied to Iran, hence part of its particularity. 
As enshrined in operative clauses 12 and 13 of Resolution 2231, in the event of a violation by any 
party, the others can refer the matter to the UNSC; where, within 30 days, a draft resolution ratifying 
the sanctions imposed in the previous UNSCRs69 will be voted on. If no resolution is adopted, the 
sanction regime in place prior to the endorsement of the JCPOA would apply. Here the second 
peculiarity, if any of the permanent members of the UNSC were to use their veto power70 when 
voting the draft resolution, sanctions would still be imposed. 
The second refers to the ballistic missile restrictions specified in Annex B of Resolution 2231 
under the heading ‘statement’. As Suzuki71 points out, it is striking that the term ‘statement’ is used 
instead of ‘restrictive measures’ –or even ‘sanctions’– thus making use of a softer term. This idea is 
certainly reinforced by including them in Annex B and not in the main body of the Resolution, 
thence implying that these are measures taken voluntarily by the E3/EU+3 and the Islamic Republic 
and not under Chapter VII of the UN Charter; and further captured by expressing that “Iran is 
called upon” rather than pointing that Iran ‘shall’ or ‘is urged to’. What is more, by referring only “to 
ballistic missiles designed to be capable of delivering nuclear weapons”, those that end up serving 
this purpose despite not being designed to do so are excluded.72 
The third and last remarkable element is the ‘sunset clauses’, whose name refers to the limited 
duration of some provisions. For instance,73 the ‘snap back’ mechanism can only be enforced for 10 
years; the UNSC will seize the Iran nuclear issue in 10 years, though as noted above with some 
nuances; the arms embargo is in place for 5 years and the ballistic missile restrictions for 8; nuclear 
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13 
 
activities expire in 15 years; and the IAEA inspections under the JCPOA last 20-25 years. 
Nevertheless, the sunset clause on the AP was put in place for Iran to come into compliance with it 
since, as highlighted above, despite having signed it, it has never entered to force in the Islamic 
Republic. The ultimate aim of this clause, moreover, was for Iran to normalise its status in the NPT 
and the IAEA.74 
The different and sometimes also divergent interests of the parties were brought together with 
some concessions –as was to be expected– and are now contained in the final document. On the one 
hand, Iran commits to reduce its nuclear programme –only developing it for peaceful purposes– and 
to allow inspections to verify and monitor that is the case. The reduction of Iran’s nuclear 
programme is directed to uranium and plutonium enrichment, allowing the former with many limits75 
and highly restricting the latter to create a bomb; banning further construction of heavy-water 
reactors and reprocessing; limiting “the number and quality of active centrifugates”;76 prohibiting 
reinstall and re-operationalise its centrifugates and enrichment infrastructures77 while ensuring 
transparency of these processes both of declared and undeclared structures and facilities. Tehran 
must also inform the IAEA and allow it to carry out inspections to verify that its reports correspond 
to its actual practices, these inspections can take place at every stage of the fuel cycle78 and are meant 
to monitor Tehran’s commitment to the JCPOA. Further, the Deal limits Iran’s capacity to acquire 
weapons with which it could incur in a violation of the AP and thus avoid any inducement. On the 
other hand, the E3/EU+3 commit to gradually lift sanctions until finally eliminating them. This 
progressive easing follows the logic of incentives79 so that Iran finds benefits by sticking to the Deal 
and is aggrieved by failing to do so. It is noteworthy that the sanctions covered by the agreement are 
only nuclear-related and that, as foreseen in the agreement, can be restored in the event of Iranian 
non-compliance through the DRM. Some of the sanctions that are object of the JCPOA were the 
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ones imposed on Iranian individuals and institutions related to the nuclear programme or the US 
secondary sanctions.80 
4. Initial years of the JCPOA with a focus on EU-Iran relations 
On 16 January 2016 (Implementation Day), once the IAEA had verified that Iran had fulfilled its 
part of the Deal, the EU and the US lifted the sanctions they had committed to in the JCPOA. The 
Union, on her behalf, lifted all economic and financial sanctions related to nuclear energy; and, the 
US, only secondary sanctions. Easing sanctions resulted in the resumption of financial and banking 
activities between entities and individuals in the Islamic Republic and the Union. Importantly, these 
certainly included Iran’s “reconnection to the SWIFT global payments system”.81 Activities related to 
the oil, gas and petrochemical sectors were reinstated as well as those related to shipping, 
shipbuilding and transport, metals, gold, other precious metals, money and software sectors.82 For 
Europe, it meant, among other things, that investors and exporters could now accede to Iran’s 
market.83 
Relations between Iran and the EU boosted after the conclusion of the JCPOA, especially on 
economy and trade with an increase in trade of 43%84 in comparison to the same period of the 
previous year when sanctions were still in place and “with EU countries accounting for more than 
one fifth of Iran’s crude oil exports”.85 Nonetheless, Iran’s expectations were higher as in 2018 “the 
overall volume remained below pre-2010 sanctions levels”,86 which was also not so low because 
despite EU’s support for UNSC sanctions, between 2008 and 2010 EU’s imports from Iranian oil 
almost doubled.87 Iran is not a member of the World Trade Organization (WTO)88 and trade with the 
 
 
80 K. SUZUKI, supra note 37, p. 189. 
81 S. SHINE; A. CATRAN, “Europe-Iran Relations One Year after the Sanctions were Lifted”, (2017) (888), INSS Insight, 
p. 1. 
82 For a more detailed information on the impact of the lifting of EU sanctions and the now permitted activities, see 
EEAS, Information Note on EU sanctions to be lifted under the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA). 
83 C. ADEBAHR; R. ALCARO, supra note 6. 
84 S. SHINE; A. CATRAN, supra note 81, p. 1. 
85 R. ALCARO; A. DESSÌ, supra note 58, p. 5. 
86 D. R. JALILVAND, supra note 1, p. 125. 
87 A. E. TORBAT, supra note 3, p. 213. 
88 Today Iran still is the largest economy outside this Organization and remains a Working Party to this. WORLD TRADE 
ORGANIZATION, “Iran”, Accession status. 
15 
 
Union is therefore subject to the EU general import regime.89 The conclusion of the JCPOA opened 
a new chapter between the EU and Iran, the talks between political representatives of both actors –
promoted by the Union– were welcomed by Tehran and served to expand on previous dialogues.90 
In 2015, the EEAS established the Iran Task Force to coordinate and develop relations between the 
EU and the Islamic Republic91 and to support the High Representative of the Union for Foreign 
Affairs and Security Policy (HR henceforth), who is the coordinator of the Joint Commission;92 the 
EEAS has been working on establishing an EU Delegation in Tehran, which has not yet 
materialised.93 
During the 2016 US election campaign, the now-former president Donald Trump already 
declared his intention to withdraw from the JCPOA. This announcement albeit took a while to 
materialise, the US unilaterally and violating UNSCR 2231 began to re-impose sanctions on Iran, 
which led Tehran to report in a questionable transparent manner on its practices as well as to prevent 
the IAEA from inspecting all its nuclear facilities.94 Iran’s provision of information was not entirely 
transparent and thus the IAEA requested it to submit additional information. In 2016, Tehran’s 
practices in accordance with the JCPOA did not correspond to what it was reporting to the IAEA; 
this in its visits was able to confirm that Iran was producing more heavy water than it had 
acknowledged in its information; in addition to carrying out some of the prohibited activities laid 
down in Annex I to the JCPOA.95 
The Union continued to pursue its interests and safeguard the JCPOA. In light of the events and 
complementary to the JCPOA, the EU enhanced its role under the agreement and elaborated a 
parallel cooperation realm with Iran in different sectors.96 High-level political visits have been crucial 
for this cooperation as through political consultation both parties have managed to find common 
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ground. Not only has the EU tried to cooperate in areas such as human rights, agriculture, trade and 
investment, but also in 2016 the Instrument for Nuclear Safety Cooperation97 allocated €5 billion to 
Iran, which was the step towards materialising the first project for nuclear cooperation with Iran in 
2017.98 
In October 2016, the European Parliament (EP) passed a resolution99 on the EU strategy towards 
Iran after the nuclear agreement. The EU expressed its intentions of continuing the next septs as a 
“‘dialogue of the four C’s’: a dialogue that is comprehensive in scope; cooperative (…); critical, open 
and frank (…); and, overall, constructive in tone and practice”.100 This Resolution expresses the 
importance of the agreement reached and “welcomes openness in the relations with Iran” by 
encouraging the development of relations between the EU and Iran in different areas and 
cooperation with other actors (civil society, NGOs and human rights defenders). The EP welcomes 
the JCPOA as a big step towards stability in the Middle East and the Gulf region because of Iran’s 
key position, which it should use towards stabilization. The Resolution also emphasises how 
beneficial for EU-Iran relations would be to establish an EU delegation in Tehran, in which the 
EEAS is still working. Notwithstanding, the EP does not dismiss the human rights situation in Iran 
and reiterates its opposition to the death penalty calling for its abolition. The Union maintains its 
commitment to not impose further sanctions on Iran if it complies with the JCPOA and to not 
prevent companies, institutions or firms from doing business with Iran as long as it follows the 
applicable law and is transparent in the processes. The EP calls transactions to be conducted in euros 
to encourage European firms to invest in Iran and to ensure that US sanctions cannot disrupt EU 
operations in the Islamic Republic.101 
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Just a month later, the Council adopted conclusions on Iran102 where it reiterated the EU’s 
commitment to the JCPOA and support to the areas of common interest that had been agreed in 
2016,103 stating that both the Union and its Member States are open to provide technical assistance 
and export credits. The Council also expressed support for Iran’s accession to the WTO; and 
concern on the Human Rights situation in the country and on the growing tensions in the region, 
urging all countries in the Middle East to work towards a more constructive regional environment 
and, especially Iran, to refrain from its military build-up understanding it as a source of instability and 
inconsistent with UNSCR 2231. 
What might appear as EU’s concessions to Iran are not so much because, in line with its strategic 
interests, human rights violations in general, and violations of freedom of expression, continued 
internet surveillance, death penalty sentences and executions in particular,104 constitute an 
impediment for the EU towards expanding trade with Iran and so has the Union expressed and 
reiterated on several occasions. These last actions were not part of the JCPOA as the US wanted to 
only focus on the non-proliferation dimension. Furthermore, while Iran believes to need to engage in 
the region to gain power and ensure its stability, the EU understands that this move would only 
increase instability in the Middle East;105 these opposing postures sometimes constitute problems for 
developing relations between Brussels and Tehran. 
In January 2017, the IAEA Director-General confirmed that Iran had “removed excess 
centrifugates and infrastructure from the Fordow FEP”106 in compliance with the JCPOA. The 
report issued by the IAEA Board of Governors in February 2017 confirmed Iran’s activities fully 
met its obligations under the JCPOA and that it was continuing to provisionally apply the AP; and in 
August, that Iran had “fully implemented” the JCPOA. The US, on its part, announced sanctions 
waivers in May, thus fulfilling its part of the Deal.107 The biannual reports issued by the UN 
Secretary-General (SG) in June and December 2017 confirmed Iran’s compliance with the JCPOA. 
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The June report108 reflected the concerns of some parties about Iran’s ballistic missile programme, 
the UN SG noted that he did not have sufficient information to clarify the situation. Again, in the 
December report,109 he stressed that some of the tests conducted by Iran could constitute a violation 
of Resolution 2231 as claimed by some parties, but that he would continue to investigate them as the 
material he had was incomplete to declare a breach of the Deal. 
5. US withdrawal from the JCPOA 
Trump announced the US was withdrawing from the JCPOA110 on 8 May 2018, in his speech he 
stated that if he “allowed this deal to stand, there would soon be a nuclear arms race in the Middle 
East”.111 In January, it had already warned the E3 that if no solution was found for the flaws of the 
Deal, it would withdraw.112 The retirement came along with the restitution of some of the sanctions 
that were in place before the JCPOA, such as those imposed on petroleum-related transactions, on 
foreign bank transactions with the CBI or foreign companies and financial institutions engaging with 
Iran.113 The withdrawal was not effective until November since deadlines of 90 and 180 days were set 
for the reimposition of sanctions.114 Although this notice was not a surprise as it had been part of 
Trump’s electoral campaign, it was believed to not be accurate by the International Community and 
notably by the other parties to the agreement. Trump had repeatedly accused Iran of not complying 
with the Deal115, yet the UN SG had to find evidence to back up these accusations. And even after 
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The binding nature of the agreement has been disputed –mainly because of its terminology, as 
explained above– yet it is in any case multilateral, implying common consent and reciprocal 
commitments. Therefore, withdrawal from one of the parties should have been agreed upon.117 The 
US is the only party to the agreement that recognises its unilateral repudiation as lawful,118 as it 
understands the JCPOA as a non-binding agreement –because of the wording ‘voluntary measures’ 
in the main body headline– and, consequently, under this premise, in International Law, there would 
be no impediment to reintroduce sanctions against Iran.119 This being said, it is questionable why the 
US did not activate the ‘snap back’ mechanism and, by using its veto power in the UNSCR vote, 
ensure the reimposition of sanctions.120 This procedure would probably have been better welcomed 
by the International Community even though there had been no “significant non-performance of 
commitments under the JCPOA”121 as required by UNSCR 2231. 
The Union’s HR at the time, Federica Mogherini,122 issued a statement123 regretting the US 
position and calling for its reconsideration. Mogherini remarked that the EU would continue to 
implement its commitments if Iran did so and expressed her concern on the newly announced 
sanctions by the US, notably remarking that lifting sanctions is an important part of the Deal. 
Furthermore, the HR stated that she would continue to protect the EU’s security interests and 
economic investments. On the 21st of May, US Secretary of State, Mike Pompeo, announced124 new 
sanctions on Iran as a penalty for its “nuclear threats, the terrorism, the missile proliferation, and the 
brutality”. The US sanctions were meant to squeeze Iran’s economy125 as Pompeo announced in 
May: “after our sanctions come in force, it will be battling to keep its economy alive”. Mogherini, 
after Pompeo’s speech, issued a statement126 emphasising the importance of the Deal for the 
International Community and the hard path for its achievement in 2015 as well as reiterated Iran’s 
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compliance with the JCPOA and the Union’s continued commitment to it. The Joint Commission 
met in Vienna on May 25th convened by the EU at Iran’s request127 to discuss moving forward. 
Ever since the US withdrawal was effective, the country implemented a ‘maximum pressure’ 
policy, whose only aim is to bring Iran to the table to negotiate a new deal. This is because 
Washington understands that the JCPOA does not prevent Tehran from acquiring the bomb since it 
does not directly address Iran’s ballistic missile programme, which it considers essential in a deal. 
Further, the ‘maximum pressure’ policy seeks to stop Iran from supporting military groups in the 
region and from curbing its foreign policy ambitions in western Asia.128 With this strategy, the US 
aims to bring the Iranian economy to the brink of collapse so that Iran is forced to sit down and 
negotiate.129 Iran had never considered Europe a significant ally,130 but since the E3 diplomatic 
efforts in the 2000s had ensuing results, its esteem for the EU reached its highest level following the 
US exit from the JCPOA. Moreover, the harm EU sanctions made to the Iranian economy made 
Tehran start to perceive the Union as an important player.131 
Consequences for the Union and its response 
After the US withdrawal, the EU expressed its firm conviction to continue with its commitments 
under the Deal –as has already been underlined above–. However, once the US re-imposed 
sanctions, the EU did not have the capacity to enforce what it had agreed on the JCPOA or to 
maintain its relations with Iran, as some of the sanctions directly affected the Union. Those sanctions 
are the so-called US secondary sanctions, which target individuals or companies outside the US 
jurisdiction –hence extraterritorial sanctions–; these individuals or companies are sanctioned by the 
US when they engage in transactions with Iran, even if they do not directly impact US activities.132 
Consequently, EU companies were not willing to do business with Iran at the expense of having 
their assets frozen by possible US sanctions. This possibility prompted SWIFT to disconnect Iranian 
 
 
127 C. D. CIMINO-ISAACS et al., supra note 113. 
128 B. IMMENKAMP, supra note 89, p. 1. 
129 M. NURUZZAMAN, “President Trump’s ‘Maximum Pressure’ Campaign and Iran’s Endgame”, (2020) 44(6), Strategic 
Analysis, pp. 570–582. 
130 D. R. JALILVAND, supra note 1, p. 128. 
131 Ibid., p. 129. 
132 R. ALCARO; A. DESSÌ, supra note 58; E. GERANMAYEH; M. LAFONT RAPNOUIL, “Meeting the challenge of secondary 
sanctions”, (2019) (289), Policy Brief, p. 7. 
21 
 
banks and thus leading the Islamic Republic to lose access to international financial markets.133 The 
European Commission’s spokesperson for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, Maja Kocijancic, 
found SWIFT’s decision “rather… regrettable”134 though the company had based it on “the interest 
of the stability and integrity of the wider global financial system”.135 
In addition to the already explained INSC, in 2018 the European Commission, in an attempt to 
support Iran’s sustainable and social development, extended bilateral cooperation through the 
Development Cooperation Instrument.136 Further, the Commission also adopted a support package 
for Iran for the amount of €50 million.137 In trying to escape US secondary sanctions, the Union has 
taken some more steps, among which three are worth highlighting. 
Update the “blocking regulation” 
In November 1996, the Council adopted Regulation No 2271/96 intending to waive the US 
extraterritorial sanctions –both in their application and actions based on or resulting from them– that 
had been imposed against Cuba, Libya and Iran,138 thus protecting EU companies.139 To this effect, 
articles 4, 5 and 6 of the Regulation140 respectively establish non-recognition or enforceability of US 
court or tribunal decision on European legal or natural persons; authorise non-compliance with US 
secondary sanctions; and recognise the entitlement to recover the damages suffered (including legal 
costs) in litigation against US companies in the EU Member States’ courts. 
This Regulation was updated in June 2018 through the adoption of a delegated regulation141 by 
the European Commission to include in the annex the US laws to be blocked –namely the ones 
enforcing secondary sanctions–. This prohibited EU companies and banks from complying with US 
secondary sanctions and thus maintaining relations with Iran. In case of non-compliance with the 
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prohibition, the EU person –natural or legal– “can be sanctioned by the competent authority of the 
Member States with jurisdiction over it”.142 Nonetheless, even if companies are compensated for the 
costs that may arise from US sanctions, companies should avoid using dollars in their transactions 
with Iran, which in case they do not, the Regulation cannot stop them from asset seizures, criminal 
charges from the US or losing access to the US financial system, among other things. In practice this 
may mean having to choose between doing business with the US or with Iran and given the size and 
importance of the US market, it is not surprising that companies opt for the former. This, moreover, 
can also lead to legal problems143 in complying with European law –and, thus, incurring on US 
secondary sanctions– or with US law –and potentially being subject to European fines–. That is why, 
the E3/EU asked the US for exemptions on sanctions against European companies and banks doing 
business with Iran.144 
European Investment Bank 
The European Investment Bank (EIB) through its External Lending Mandate (ELM) supports 
small and medium enterprises, develops social and economic infrastructures and supports the 
development of the local private sector, inter alia.145 It was thought that by extending the EIB’s 
mandate to Iran, Tehran would come in compliance with the JCPOA. 
The European Parliament and Council Decision No 466/2014/EU146 grants the EIB with an EU 
budgetary guarantee on external lending. The European Commission on its Delegated Decision 
2018/1102147 incorporates Iran into the list of “potentially eligible regions and countries” for the 
EIB’s ELM. Nonetheless, no Framework Agreement has ever been in place148 as the EIB could be 
banned from accessing the US market.149 
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Instrument in Support of Trade Exchanges 
In January 2019, the E3 established the Instrument in Support of Trade Exchanges (INSTEX) as 
a Special Purpose Vehicle (SPV) to allow trade with Iran; in December six150 other European States 
joined as stakeholders. INSTEX is a payment system that acts as an intermediary between Europe 
and Iran when carrying out financial transactions in humanitarian goods (medicines, medical devices 
and food),151 whether public or private, national or international152 and with full support from the 
Member States. This SPV operates with a “twin financial mechanism set up in Iran”153 that ensures 
transparency throughout the process.154 The money never crosses borders as there are no direct 
transfers; transactions between European countries and Iran are netted between their exports and 
imports. For example,155 a European company sells medical goods to an Iranian firm for €500.000 
and, at the same time, an Iranian exporter sends nuts to Europe for the same amount. Provided that 
INSTEX has approved the transaction, the European exporter of medical goods will receive the 
money from the European importer of nuts, and, in turn, the Iranian importer of medical goods will 
pay to the Iranian exporter of nuts. 
INSTEX was meant to serve as a bypass or insulated trade channel for European Institutions to 
escape US sanctions156 while maintaining trade with Iran and, not least, preserve the JCPOA. In 
February 2019, Iran welcomed this initiative by the E3 and, at the same time, the US in the 
international ministerial submit that took place in the Middle East dismissed and condemned the 
creation of INSTEX as it believed that was contrary to its sanctions against Iran and “urged Europe 
to withdraw from the Iran nuclear deal”.157 
 
 
EU guarantee to the European Investment Bank against losses under financing operations supporting investment 
projects outside the Union, COM(2020) 96 final. 
149 E. GERANMAYEH; M. LAFONT RAPNOUIL, supra note 132. 
150 Belgium, Denmark, Finland, the Netherlands, Norway and Sweden. B. IMMENKAMP, supra note 89. 
151 R. ALCARO; A. DESSÌ, supra note 58, p. 9. 
152 N. VERÓN, “INSTEX: Gateway to EU strategic autonomy?”, 2019. 
153 R. ALCARO; A. DESSÌ, supra note 58, p. 9; B. IMMENKAMP, supra note 89, pp. 10–11. 
154 E. BATMANGHELIDJ; E. GERANMAYEH, “Trading with Iran via the special purpose vehicle: How it can work – 
European Council on Foreign Relations”, 2019, European Council on Foreign Relations, retrieved 6 May 2021 at 
https://ecfr.eu/article/commentary_trading_with_iran_special_purpose_vehicle_how_it_can_work/. 
155 Ibid.; B. IMMENKAMP, supra note 89. 
156 As humanitarian goods are not subject to US sanctions, INSTEX was put in place to trade with such goods. E. 
BATMANGHELIDJ; E. GERANMAYEH, supra note 154. 
157 K. DAVENPORT, “EU Trade Tool Seeks to Save Iran Nuclear Deal”, (2019) 49(2), Arms Control Today, pp. 33–34. 
24 
 
That fear of interacting with Iran that European companies have is one of the reasons why 
INSTEX has not been successful as well as Tehran’s lack of liquidity and other technical problems.158 
There were high hopes on this instrument that were never met, it took longer than expected to start 
working and only one transaction has ever been made (March 2020159); which leads to believe that it 
will never play a significant role. It is still unclear whether INSTEX would have been more 
successful if it had been designed for all EU Member States instead of only for the E3 besides some 
other countries joining in later. 
6. Iran’s consecutive breaches of the JCPOA and EU’s responses 
Following the US withdrawal, Iran decided to continue to comply with its obligations under the 
JCPOA as it expected the other parties to do so as well. However, due to US secondary sanctions, 
none of the parties was able to fully comply with their obligations. And, further, in April 2019, the 
US announced that it would not extend the sanctions waivers for the countries importing Iranian oil 
or for non-proliferation projects in the JCPOA framework.160 This action was intended to pressure 
Iran to stop its provocations,161 but it had the opposite effect. On 8 May, the Iranian president 
announced they would be exceeding the limits of low-enriched uranium production set up in the 
JCPOA and heavy water,162 which means a reduction of its commitments under the Deal163 and that 
it would only return to them when there was a solution to its oil164 and metal exports and banking 
transactions were facilitated.165 The E3/EU issued a joint statement166 expressing its great concern on 
the declaration made by Iran urging it to comply with its commitments under the JCPOA and 
expressing its preservation and implementation. They also called the other parties to not take actions 
that could force the other parties to not comply with the Deal. A role reversal can thus be seen, with 
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Iran now threatening not to comply with the Deal if there are sanctions against it,167 rather than the 
other parties pressuring Tehran on imposing sanctions if it does not adhere to the JCPOA.168 
Furthermore, it is unclear whether Iran is complying with the NPT.169 
Iran’s non-compliance with the JCPOA starts on the 1st of July 2019, and although it was 
announced, its actions constitute in any case violations of the Deal. In the first breach, Iran exceeds 
the limits on enriched uranium stockpile set out in the JCPOA and so is verified and reported by the 
IAEA.170 Just seven days later, the second violation occurred, of which the IAEA was informed of 
and reported on the following day;171 this time Iran went beyond the uranium enrichment levels. In 
September, Tehran surpassed the restrictions on R&D with advanced centrifugates and cascades 
being this its third breach of the Deal172 confirmed by the IAEA in one of its reports.173 The 
resumption of uranium enrichment at the Fordow FEP174 and the exceeding of the heavy water 
stockpile limit175 established in the JCPOA in November constitute the fourth violation. Davenport 
and Kimball176 argue that even if these actions constitute violations of the JCPOA, at no point could 
they pose an immediate proliferation risk or significantly reduce the time to acquire a bomb. Such 
actions are therefore intended to strain the other parties to deliver their promises and alleviate the 
pressure put on the Iranian economy. The UN SG, on its 2019 second report on the Implementation 
of Security Council Resolution 2231, stated that the US sanctions are contrary to the JCPOA goals 
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and that they could impede Iran’s ability to implement it.177 Likewise, he regretted Tehran’s reduced 
commitment to the provisions of the agreement.178 
The next turning point is the assassination of Qasem Soleimani in early January 2020, who was 
the head of the Revolutionary Guards’ Quds Force. The killing was claimed by the US and justified 
to protect its “people and interests around the world”.179 Consequently, Iran’s response was to 
further reduce its commitments under the Deal by not sticking to the limitations on the number of 
centrifugates nor on uranium enrichment (fifth breach). Although it stressed that it would continue 
to cooperate with the IAEA and that it would only return to the restrictions under the JCPOA when 
there were no sanctions against it and it achieved the benefits thereupon agreed.180 The E3 in a joint 
statement called Iran to refrain from proliferation and urged it “to reverse all measures inconsistent 
with the JCPOA”.181 Some days later, they issued a new statement explaining they had referred Iran’s 
violations of the JCPOA to the Joint Commission under the DRM in good faith, making clear that 
their commitment to the Deal and its preservation would continue and that at no time were they 
“joining a campaign to implement maximum pressure”.182 This movement though supported by the 
EU was rejected by China and Russia, the other parties to the Deal.183 Josep Borrell,184 as 
Coordinator of the Joint Commission, stated that the DRM was triggered to achieve “full and 
comprehensive implementation of the JCPOA” and in no case intended to re-impose sanctions on 
Iran.185 However, the Islamic Republic further announced that it had exceeded the limits on 
enriching uranium186 and that it would withdraw from the NPT if it was referred to the UNSC under 
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the DRM.187 The European parties reiterated that, for the moment, they would not go under the time 
frame expressed in the agreement that would finally impose sanctions on Iran; so was demonstrated 
when Borrell extended the timeline.188 
The Joint Commission met in Vienna on the 26th of February 2020 to address Iran’s reduced 
commitments under the JCPOA. While acknowledging that this was partly due to the re-imposition 
of sanctions by the US after its withdrawal, the parties recognised that preservation of the agreement 
is essential for non-proliferation and expressed concern about Iranian activities.189 In March, the 
IAEA Director-General during the Board of Governors meeting addressed that they had identified 
“possible undeclared nuclear material and nuclear-related activities” in Iran and that it had “not 
provided access to the locations”. The Director-General called Iran to cooperate with the Agency 
and noted that there had been no changes on “Iran’s implementation of its nuclear-related 
commitments under the JCPOA”.190 Such is the lack of change in Iran’s compliance that in April it 
“launched its first military satellite”191 and refuelled its Bushehr nuclear power plant.192 
To commemorate the 5th Anniversary of the JCPOA, in July 2020, as coordinator of the Deal, 
Borrell published an article193 where he stressed the importance of the agreement and the costly 
diplomatic negotiations for its conclusion. He highlighted that it is not a symbolic agreement as it 
meant the end of Iranian isolation in the International Community with the lifting of sanctions; and 
called for full implementation and compliance as the US secondary sanctions that followed this 
country’s withdrawal made it impossible for the other parties of the agreement to deliver on their 
promises, which led Iran to stop its commitments as it believed it had not received the expected 
economic benefits arising from the Deal. 
In 2006 the UN started to impose an embargo on conventional arms sales to Iran, UNSCR 2231 
provided for an extension of this until October 2020. Pompeo already in April 2020 during a press 
availability expressed the US intention not to let the embargo expire in October and to work for so 
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in the UNSC.194 At the US request and after it drafted a Resolution, a vote was held in the UNSC in 
August, which did not result in any extension of the embargo as only the US and the Dominican 
Republic voted in favour.195 In this situation, the US had threatened to activate the DRM and so it 
did while claiming to be a legal party to the JCPOA, despite its withdrawal in May 2018.196 In the 
already mentioned press availability, the US Secretary of State expressed that they “don’t have to 
declare [them]selves a participant” of UNSCR 2231 as they believe the that as members of the 
UNSC, it is clear that the rights resulting from its resolution also apply to them. The other parties to 
the Deal do not consider the US to be a party to JCPOA, or even a participant. The arms embargo 
eventually elapsed and the US imposed sanctions by way of blocking the property of US entities that 
sell, broker or facilitate arms transactions to Iran.197 Further, some months earlier, at the end of May, 
the US had already announced198 the end of the sanctions waiver that covered nuclear projects in 
Iran under the JCPOA; an announcement that the E3/EU deeply regretted.199 In July 2020, the HR 
of the Union as coordinator of the Joint Commission of the JCPOA announced that he had received 
a letter from Iran triggering the DRM because of concerns of the E3 in implementing the 
agreement.200 
During this year, different IAEA reports in March,201 June,202 September,203 and November204 
revealed that Iran had exceeded the limits of enriched uranium and heavy water stockpile. Moreover, 
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another report in November205 declared that Iran had installed a new cascade in the Natanz FEP. In 
December, the E3 released a joint statement206 expressing their worry over the installation of three 
cascades of advanced centrifugates at the FEP in Natanz, following an announcement by the IAEA. 
After the JCPOA ministerial meeting of December, the parties “agreed to continue dialogue to 
ensure full JCPOA implementation” and welcomed the possibility of the US joining in again.207 
2021 begins as a turbulent year, the IAEA reports from early January that Iran has resumed 
uranium enrichment and wants to pursue R&D activities on uranium metal production.208 The E3 
responded with a joint statement expressing concern about Iran’s announcement because “Iran has 
no credible civilian use for uranium metal”.209 The Islamic Republic announced that it had tested a 
new satellite launcher at the beginning of February and two months later launched its first military 
satellite.210 Further, it also started non-compliance with the Safeguards Agreement and reiterated that 
all steps are reversible and conditional on the lifting of sanctions. Notably, the most important 
reduction of compliance under the JCPOA is monitoring. Because of Iran’s conditionality, the IAEA 
offered to negotiate a temporary bilateral agreement so that verification and monitoring by the 
Agency could continue even under Iran’s non-compliance with the Deal.211 The Islamic Republic 
remained consistent on continuing failure to meet its obligations and communicated to the IAEA in 
April that it would enrich uranium to over sixty per cent in its advanced centrifugates. To which the 
E3 responded with a new joint statement declaring that such action is a major step in the acquisition 
of a nuclear weapon as it has no credible civilian need for enrichment at that level. They also 
expressed concern about the Natanz centrifugates and qualified the whole development as 
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regrettable at a time when the US membership to the Deal is being negotiated after Trump’s 
withdrawal.212 
7. Possible re-joining of the US 
Relations between Iran and the US in recent years, and more specifically after the latter’s exit 
from the JCPOA, have been marked by distance and sanctions. Albeit in recent months, both sides 
have declared their intention to get closer, but not without conditions. The US said it was willing to 
lift sanctions against Iran if it complied with the JCPOA and the Iranian president in June 2020 
declared they have no problem on resuming talks with the US, but only if it apologised for 
withdrawing, compensated Tehran for the damage caused213 and returned to the agreement, which 
entails the lifting of sanctions. In any case, what has been seen is the intention to come closer and to 
reach a possible solution even if no one wants to take the first step. 
Biden’s victory in the November 2020 US presidential election was seen as an opportunity for a 
US return to the JCPOA. Yet the goal of the current and previous US administration is the same: to 
prevent Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons. The way to do so is different, with Trump advocating 
for sanctions and even military action, and Biden defending lifting sanctions and returning to the 
JCPOA.214 US foreign policy took a turn following Biden’s appointment as from his first moment in 
office he conceived diplomacy as the way to conduct and not only to prevent Iran from getting 
nuclear weapons. So has been reflected both in its relationship with the EU and with the parties to 
the JCPOA. In February 2021, the US and the E3 held a ministerial meeting during which they 
recognised the key relevance of the JCPOA for the nuclear non-proliferation regime and to ensure 
that Iran does not develop a nuclear weapon. For so, they affirmed their objective is for Iran to 
return to full compliance with the Deal –which would lead the US to do the same– and to strengthen 
the JCPOA. Further, the E3 welcomed the US intention to return to diplomacy with Iran.215 In early 
May, during the G7 Ministerial, Borrell and the Secretary of State of the US discussed some 
 
 
212 E3, Iran to start uranium enrichment up to 60%: E3 statement. 
213 P. HAFEZI; A. HEAVENS; W. MACLEAN, “Iran says it’s ready for talks if U.S. apologises over nuclear pact”, Reuters, 
2020: Dubai. 
214 S. STEIN; S. BROM, “Israeli Policy on Iran vis-à-vis the Biden Administration”, (2021) 1422, INSS Insight. 
215 E3; US, Joint Statement by the Secretary of State of the United States of America and the Foreign Ministers of France, Germany, and 
the United Kingdom. 
31 
 
important bilateral issues, addressed the possible return of the US to the Deal and “how to ensure an 
effective implementation of the JCPOA”.216 
Since the beginning of April, meetings in Vienna between the parties to the JCPOA to discuss the 
possible re-joining of the US have been ongoing, with up to six rounds of negotiations.217 The 
current parties to the JCPOA are discussing at the same table while the US delegation is in another 
hotel over Iran’s refusal to negotiate face-to-face. To this end, Enrique Mora218 is acting as a 
diplomatic intermediary between the US and Iran.219 Although talks are currently on standby pending 
the election of Iran’s president following its presidential election on 18 June220 and many issues 
remain unresolved, many have already been addressed and it seems that a final agreement is closer. 
On the same day as the elections in Iran, the Union’s High Representative and Iran’s foreign ministry 
met during the Antalya diplomatic forum. Borrell stressed the flexibility needed to reach an 
agreement due to the difficulty and importance of the decisions and called for Iran’s continued 
commitment under the JCPOA regardless of the outcome of the election.221 
The eventual agreement reached will only be the first step for the US but the last for Iran. The US 
recognises the negotiations under the JCPOA as essential to impede Iran to acquire nuclear weapons 
but understands that Iran’s ballistic program should be included in a Deal and that its role in the 
regional proxy wars needs to be tackled as well, though separately from the Deal. Conversely, for 
Tehran, the US re-joining the Deal is the last step as it seeks the lifting of sanctions and the 
consequent revitalization of its economy. The US return to the JCPOA will not mean that all 
sanctions in place against Iran are waived; there is no agreement in the US Congress on non-nuclear-
related sanctions, especially those relating to human rights and terrorism, so it seems quite unlikely 
that sanctions outside the scope of the Deal will eventually be lifted. 
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The Iran nuclear crisis can be said to begin in 2003 following the IAEA’s discovery that Iran was 
working on its nuclear programme through secret facilities. Yet, EU-Iran relations predate this and 
before the crisis began, they developed through two EU-promoted dialogues, the first critical (1992) 
and the second comprehensive (1998). 
During the early years of the crisis, the negotiating team advocating for diplomacy as the solution 
to the crisis was led by the E3, who were joined by Javier Solana as the Union’s High Representative 
for CFSP. That the High Representative of the Union joined the E3 was remarkable, to say the least, 
as it was a very new figure in the EU institutional structure, little known outside it. Moreover, the EU 
emerged on the most sensitive question in international relations when the broader international 
context was incredibly contested. The achievements of these first years can be therefore attributed to 
the diplomacy of the E3, which led to the signing of the Paris Agreement in 2004. The 2005 Iranian 
election ended this agreement and began Iran’s non-compliance with the AP to the Safeguards 
Agreement; this prompted the IAEA to refer the issue to the UNSC. 
From 2006 onwards, the UNSC will be responsible for passing several resolutions222 imposing 
sanctions on Iran for its nuclear activities, such as the continued enrichment and reprocessing of 
uranium and nuclear R&D. Despite the best efforts of the E3 and the sanctions imposed, Iran did 
not cease its activities and the UNSC, therefore, chose to extend sanctions in its successive 
resolutions. These sanctions –which included but were not limited to an asset freeze, a ban on arms 
sales to and purchases from Iran and a ban on dual-use goods– had no effect on Iran’s nuclear 
programme as it continued its course. This led the EU in 2010 to impose unilateral sanctions on the 
Islamic Republic in parallel to the multilateral sanctions it had supported through the UNSC and 
continued to support. As pointed out, this marked a turning point because the EU recognised that 
UN sanctions were not enough to halt Iran’s nuclear programme for military purposes and because 
the sanctions it imposes encompass activities not directly linked to this. Thus, during the period 
2010-2013, the EU established unilateral restrictive measures such as the boycott or the embargo on 
Iranian crude oil, despite its substantial harm on the Union’s economy –which was still suffering the 
consequences of the 2007 economic crisis– and its significant impact on the depreciation of the euro. 
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Rouhani’s election as Iran’s president in 2013 opened the door to diplomacy between the 
E3/EU+3 and Iran; this allowed for the conclusion of the Joint Plan of Action in 2013, a remarkable 
development since it was the predecessor to the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action. This last is the 
greatest success of the EEAS technical capabilities and of European diplomacy. On the one hand, it 
is thanks to the E3 and its negotiating strategy since 2003 that this agreement was concluded. On the 
other hand, without EU’s mediation between the E3 and the 3 in negotiations, it could not have 
been closed either. The JCPOA allowed the Union to partly secure its interests in Iran and the 
Middle East, as for a short period of time it seemed that security of the region would not be 
subjected by Iran’s nuclear weapons or by factors that were conditioned by them. Furthermore, it 
ended with Iran’s isolation in the International Community as the sanctions related to its nuclear 
programme were lifted; this was Tehran’s main driver to signing the JCPOA as not doing so would 
have only meant more sanctions and, thus, further isolation and collapse of its economy. 
US withdrawal from the JCPOA was a tragedy as this Deal was –and still is– a key issue in many 
areas: proliferation, security in the Middle East, International Law and the value of multilateral 
diplomacy. Above all, it was a catastrophe for the Union, as the JCPOA has been considered one of 
the EU’s greatest foreign policy successes. The Iran nuclear crisis has not been the only conflict in 
which the EU has advocated for diplomacy rather than military action as the solution; for example, it 
has also done so in Libya and Syria. The US withdrawal compromised this hard-won European 
position. Further, it could be said that the secondary sanctions that followed the US withdrawal 
prevented the Union from delivering on its own will and even on its promises, as it impeded the EU 
from fulfilling the commitments made under the JCPOA. This frustrated Iran and was highlighted 
on numerous occasions, such as in Rouhani’s January 2021 televised speech, when he said that “the 
Europeans have failed to fulfil their promises”223 as he believes the Union “failed to act as an 
independent bloc” from the US. It is this lack of compliance that led Tehran to trigger the DRM in 
July 2020 against the E3 and to stop perceiving the EU as an important player on the international 
scene. Alcaro and Dessì even argue that US secondary sanctions have had more impact on “EU’s 
foreign policy than the stated intentions of EU governments”.224 All this, of course, has done great 
damage to Europe’s credibility. While it is true that the EU took steps outside the JCPOA to 
 
 
223 P. HAFEZI et al., supra note 213. 
224 R. ALCARO; A. DESSÌ, supra note 58, p. 20. 
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improve and continue its relationship with Iran. First, by developing a broad bilateral agenda towards 
Iran complementary to the JCPOA, and then some steps to preserve the JCPOA after the US 
withdrawal –namely updating the 1996 blocking regulation, extending EIB’s mandate and INSTEX–. 
These have not had a real impact on the continuation of the JCPOA and, in particular, on Iran’s 
compliance with it.225 
With Biden at the helm of the US administration, hope for a deal has returned. The role of the 
current HR of the Union, besides its position as coordinator of the JCPOA Joint Commission, is not 
prominent; it could be argued that this is the main consequence that the Trump era has revealed: the 
limits of what the EU can and cannot do. Even if a new agreement is reached in the coming months, 
the EU’s credibility will not be fully restored. This agreement that is now on the table and to which 
the US might re-join has an expiry date: 2026. There are only five years left and many issues to deal 
with since, like the US, European countries would like to address many more, mainly Iran’s role in 
the region, something Tehran is reluctant to do. Even if the US joins the JCPOA and the steps taken 
by Iran in the last years are reversible, the Islamic Republic is closer to having a nuclear bomb as the 
actions taken during the last years have led it to acquire technological knowledge and capabilities that 
it did not have before; once it knows, it cannot unlearn. There is a need for Europeans to play the 
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